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Abstract 
Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that 
is focused solely on agents’ psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high 
life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the 
ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral value of agents’ lives. Five studies 
systematically investigate and explain the impact of morality on ordinary assessments of 
happiness. Study 1 demonstrates that moral judgments influence assessments of happiness not 
only for untrained participants, but also for academic researchers and even in those who study 
happiness specifically. Studies 2 and 3 then respectively ask whether this effect may be 
explained by general motivational biases or beliefs in a just world. In both cases, we find 
evidence against these explanations. Study 4 shows that the impact of moral judgments cannot be 
explained by changes in the perception of descriptive psychological states. Finally, Study 5 
compares the impact of moral and non-moral value, and provides evidence that unlike non-moral 
value, moral value is part of the criteria that govern the ordinary concept of happiness. Taken 
together, these studies provide a specific explanation of how and why the ordinary concept of 
happiness deviates from the definition used by researchers studying happiness. 
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True Happiness: The Role of Morality in the Folk Concept of Happiness 
  
One important aspect of people's ordinary understanding of the mind is their concept 
of happiness. This paper aims to investigate that ordinary concept. What criteria do people use 
when trying to determine whether or not someone counts as happy? In considering this question, 
one obvious place to start is with the accounts of happiness developed by researchers in 
psychology and philosophy. Within psychology, research on happiness has converged on a 
conception of happiness that is straightforwardly descriptive. That is, it suggests that whether or 
not someone is happy is simply a matter of the psychological states a person has (Diener, 2000; 
Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 2004; Gruber, Mauss & Tamir, 2011; Lucas, Diener & Lawson, 2003; 
Zou, Schimmack & Gere, 2013). In contrast to this purely descriptive conception of happiness, 
philosophers have long argued that whether or not one is happy is at least partially an evaluative 
question. Put simply, the basic suggestion is that happiness is not only a matter of feeling good, 
but also a matter of being good (Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002; Foot, 2001; Kraut, 1979).  
The studies reported here draw on these theoretical frameworks to explore questions 
about people's ordinary folk concept of happiness. In particular, the key question is whether (a) 
people's ordinary concept is purely descriptive or (b) people's ordinary concept actually involves 
an evaluative component.  
Theories of Happiness 
The past years have witnessed impressive advances in empirical research on happiness 
(e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Gruber, Mauss & Tamir, 2011; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). 
One key advance within this field has been the convergence on a conception of happiness that 
involves three elements: high positive affect, low negative affect, and high life satisfaction 
5 
 
(Diener, 2000; Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 2004; Lucas, Diener & Lawson, 2003; Zou, 
Schimmack & Gere, 2013). Focusing on this conception, researchers developed a number of 
methods for measuring positive and negative affective states, as well as general life satisfaction, 
which has yielded important insights about the descriptive nature of happiness (Csikszentmihalyi 
& Larson, 1987; Hektner, Schmidt & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & 
Griffin, 1985; Pavot & Diener, 2008; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Clark, 1994). 
Critically, this way of measuring and understanding happiness seeks to provide accurate 
descriptions of the psychological states that people experience, but does not focus or specifically 
assess moral evaluations (for reviews, see Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 2004; Lyubomirsky, King 
& Diener, 2005). Thus, the conception of happiness employed by psychologists is thoroughly 
descriptive rather than evaluative. 
  By contrast, a number of philosophers have argued that evaluative considerations are 
directly relevant to happiness (Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002; Foot, 2001; Kraut, 1979). On this way 
of understanding happiness, one cannot decide whether or not someone is happy with only 
descriptive information about the psychological states that person experiences. Instead, whether 
or not she is actually happy depends in part on whether she is living a life that is evaluatively 
good. On this sort of view, for example, a Nazi commandant who thoroughly enjoys and is 
satisfied with fulfilling his work in a death camp, cannot actually be happy, no matter which 
descriptive psychological states he might experience (Foot, 2001, 90-96). Happiness requires 
one’s life actually be good in addition to having the psychological states that make one feel 
good.  
The Ordinary Concept of Happiness 
Within the existing literature, it has often been suggested that people's ordinary concept 
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of happiness is purely descriptive (Cooper, 1987; Crisp, 2008; Feldman, 2010; Gilbert, 2006; 
Haybron, 2008; 2011; Sidgwick, 1907/1966). As Daniel Gilbert puts it: “Happiness is a word 
that we generally use to indicate an experience and not the actions that give rise to it. Does it 
make sense to say, ‘After a day spent killing his parents, Frank was happy’? Indeed it does…” 
(Gilbert, 2006: 36-7). 
A series of empirical studies suggest, however, that ordinary assessments of happiness 
are influenced by the moral value of the agent’s life (e.g., Newman et al., 2015; Phillips, et al., 
2011). In one study, for example, participants were told about a person who experiences a lot of 
positive affect, very little negative affect, and is highly satisfied with her life when she reflects 
on it. Participants were randomly assigned to learn either that this person was living a morally 
good life or that this person was living a morally bad life. Those who read about the person 
living a morally good life tended to agree that she was happy, while those who read about a 
person living a morally bad life tended to disagree (Phillips et al., 2011). Moreover, a number of 
additional studies suggested that individual differences in participants’ moral judgments 
predicted their assessments of happiness (Phillips et al., 2014).  
A question now arises as to what this effect is showing about people's ordinary concept of 
happiness. We will be focusing here on three basic families of hypotheses. 
(1) Bias or distortion. One possible view would be that people’s concept of happiness is 
itself purely descriptive and the impact of moral considerations arises solely from some kind of 
performance error. For example, it might be thought that the entire effect is explained by people 
getting confused and failing to correctly apply their own concept. Additionally, as this effect 
involves negative moral assessments, participants’ judgments may also be explained by 
motivational biases such as those that have been well-documented in social psychology (e.g., 
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people’s intuitions might be distorted by a desire to believe in a ‘just world’; Lerner, 1980). 
Given the widespread presence of these kinds of motivational biases, it is highly likely that these 
forms of motivated reasoning play some role in participants’ assessments of happiness. The 
essential question is whether these performance errors entirely account for the impact of morality 
on assessments of happiness. If this turns out to be the case, people’s underlying concept of 
happiness could still be purely descriptive (see Figure 1a). 
 (2) Mediation through descriptive psychological states. A second possibility would be 
that people’s concept of happiness is purely descriptive and that the effect of moral 
considerations arises solely because these considerations impact people’s judgments about 
whether or not the agent has the relevant descriptive properties (see Figure 1b). Thus, suppose 
that people see happiness as basically just a matter of having certain specific psychological states 
(high positive affect, low negative affect, judgments of life satisfaction). It might then turn out 
that when people believe that an agent’s life is morally bad, they tend to think of the agent as not 
experiencing these states. This possibility is supported by previous research that demonstrated a 
connection between happiness and morality by showing that participants tend to infer that people 
are morally good when they report being happy and finding meaning in their jobs (King & Napa, 
1998). As with the first hypothesis, previous research gives us reason to expect that such an 
effect exists, and the critical question we take up is whether or not changes in the perception of 
descriptive psychological states fully accounts for the impact of morality. If this turns out to be 
the case, then people’s moral judgments would have an impact on happiness attributions, but this 
impact would be mediated by people’s attribution of purely descriptive psychological states, and 
thus the folk concept of happiness would be purely descriptive. 
(3) An evaluative concept of happiness. Finally, it might be that people’s ordinary 
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concept of happiness is itself fundamentally evaluative. That is, independent of anything about 
how people attribute descriptive psychological states, people might see moral considerations as 
directly relevant to the question as to whether an agent is truly happy (see Figure 1c). On such a 
view, people's moral judgments might impact their assessment of the agent's psychological 
states, but even if we completely hold fixed the assessment of psychological states, there should 
still be an impact of moral judgment on happiness attributions. 
At the core of this last hypothesis is the idea that the impact of moral considerations is 
not to be explained in terms of a bias, or in terms of an impact on people's attributions of 
psychological states, but rather in terms of something about people's concept of happiness, i.e., 
their understanding of what it means for a person to truly be happy. If this hypothesis turns out to 
be correct, the next step would be to spell it out in more detail by drawing on work in the 
psychology of concepts. The present paper does not attempt to pursue that next step; we simply 
ask whether this effect is to be understood in terms of the concept of happiness at all. (For some 
initial thoughts about how to explain this effect in terms of the psychology of concepts, see the 
General Discussion.) 
The evaluative concept hypothesis might at first seem highly counterintuitive or 
implausible. However, it should be noted that existing research has provided evidence for 
analogous hypotheses regarding numerous other concepts. For example, it may seem initially 
that moral considerations play no role in the concepts of intentional action, causation, freedom, 
or knowledge, but existing research provides evidence the moral considerations actually do play 
a role in all of those other concepts (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Knobe, 2003; Kominsky, 
Phillips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado & Knobe, 2015; Leslie, Knobe & Cohen, 2006; Samland, 
Josephs, Waldmann & Rakoczy, 2016; Phillips, Luguri & Knobe, 2015; Young & Phillips, 
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2011). It is therefore at least worth considering the possibility that moral considerations might 
play a role in the concept of happiness as well.  
The Present Investigation 
 The present investigation aims to decide between these three hypotheses, determining 
whether the impact of moral considerations is best explained in terms of bias or distortion, 
mediation through changes in assessments of descriptive psychological states, or the evaluative 
character of the concept itself.  
 Five studies consider these hypotheses in turn. Studies 1, 2 and 3 provide evidence that 
the effect of evaluative judgments on ordinary assessments of happiness is unlikely to be the 
result of a performance error or motivational bias. Studies 4a and 4b demonstrate that evaluative 
judgments selectively impact assessments of happiness, and do not influence similar assessments 
of emotion, suggesting that this effect is not mediated by changes in the perception of purely 
description psychological states. Study 5 then asks whether the concept of happiness is itself 
evaluative, and finds direct evidence that it is. 
 
Study 1: The Ordinary Concept of Happiness, from Experts to the Folk 
Previous research provided some evidence that assessments of how happy a person is are 
affected by whether that person is living a morally good life (Phillips et al. 2014). However, this 
research employed a between-subjects design and asked completely untrained participants to 
make assessments of whether or not an agent was happy based on only a single brief vignette. 
Accordingly, one may worry that these results do not actually reflect the ordinary concept of 
happiness but arose from a misunderstanding of the task, or reflected a pattern of responses that 
participants would not actually endorse upon reflection (Tiberius, 2013). To get a better sense for 
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the robustness of the effect of moral value on assessments of happiness, the current study 
differed from previous research in two key ways. First, we implemented a mixed within-subjects 
/ between-subjects design, allowing us to ask whether participants would continue to say that 
those living morally good lives were happier than those living morally bad lives, even when it 
was made explicit that the only difference between them was a moral difference. Second, we 
recruited researchers in psychology and philosophy to participate alongside untrained 
participants. This allowed us to ask whether the effect of moral value on assessments of 
happiness differed across three different populations: (1) non-researchers, (2) scientific or 
philosophical researchers, and (3) experts who have studied happiness specifically.   
Study 1 Methods 
Participants 
 Previous research on the effect of morality on happiness found a Cohen’s d of 1.603 
(Phillips et al., 2011). In the present studies, all samples were large enough to have greater than 
95% power to replicate this key effect with an alpha of .05. Sample sizes were always 
determined a priori and the data were never analyzed prior to completing data collection. We 
aimed to recruit participants in three categories: (1) Non-researchers, who had never conducted 
philosophical or scientific research, (2) Researchers who had conducted research but were not 
experts on happiness research in particular, and (3) Experts who studied and conducted research 
on happiness. 294 Non-researchers (127 females; 2 unreported, Mage= 31.21, SDage =11.16) were 
recruited from the United States using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang & 
Gosling 2011; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava & John 2004). 299 Researchers and Experts (184 
females; 13 unreported, Mage = 34.95, SDage = 10.31) were recruited through academic 
psychology listervs (e.g., International Society for Research in Emotion, Judgment and Decision 
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Making, Society for Affective Neuroscience, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Society for 
Affective Science, Society for Psychophysiological Research, Society for Research in Child 
Development, and Society for Research in Psychopathology).  
Measures 
Happiness attribution. Participants rated their agreement with the following statement 
“[Agent] is happy” on a scale from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely agree”). 
Comprehension check. Three items measured whether participants understood that the 
agent satisfied all three criteria of the scientific definition of happiness. Specifically, participants 
provided a true/false rating for three statements of the following form: (1) “[Agent’s name] feels 
good and generally experiences a lot of pleasant emotions”; (2) “[Agent’s name] rarely 
experiences negative emotions”, and (3) “[Agent’s name] feels highly satisfied with the way 
[she/he] lives.” Because we wanted to ensure that any difference in responses was due to a moral 
difference but not a difference in whether the agent was viewed as having the scientifically 
agreed upon traits of happiness, participants who answered “False” on any one of these three 
questions were excluded. 
 Justification of happiness ratings. Participants in the within-subjects condition were 
asked to respond to the following prompt: “Please explain why the difference between the two 
passages either was or was not relevant to the question of happiness.” 
Demographic items. Demographic items measured participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
education, socio-economic status (SES), and whether or not they conduct philosophical or 
scientific research. 
 Happiness expertise scale. Participants responded to the three following items on a scale 
from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“completely”): (1) “To what degree do you identify yourself as a 
12 
 
happiness / positive psychology researcher?” (2) “To what degree do you consider yourself an 
emotion researcher / affective scientist?” (3) “How familiar are you with the research on positive 
psychology and happiness?” 
Study 1 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a between-subjects version of the study or a 
within-subjects version of the study. In the between-subjects version, participants were randomly 
assigned to read one brief vignette about one of three different agents (a janitor, a nurse, or an 
uncle). For each agent, participants were then randomly assigned to either a “morally good” or 
“morally bad” condition. In the morally good condition, participants read a paragraph which 
described the agent as living a morally good life (helping students, caring for sick children, etc.); 
in the morally bad condition, participants read a paragraph that described the agent as living a 
morally bad life (cheating on a spouse, killing children, etc.). The full vignettes and all other 
study materials are available at https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness. In the within-
subjects version, participants were randomly assigned to read both the morally good and morally 
bad vignettes for one of the three different agents. The two vignettes were presented in 
counterbalanced order. 
Across both conditions, in each of the six vignettes in the 2 (Moral Value) x 3 (Agent) 
design, the agents’ mental states were always described as satisfying the criteria for the scientific 
definition of happiness, having high levels of positive affect, low levels of negative affect, and 
high levels of life-satisfaction. Furthermore, the description of the agents’ mental states were 
matched across all vignettes, such that only the specific agent’s name and personal pronouns 
were changed. After reading the vignette(s), all participants completed the happiness attribution 
item and the comprehension check items. Participants in the within-subjects condition 
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additionally completed the justification of happiness ratings item. Finally, all participants 
completed the demographic items and expertise scale.  
Data Analysis Approach 
When appropriate, our analyses are conducted with linear mixed-effects models that 
allow for participants and items (e.g., different scenarios) to be modeled as random factors. This 
approach to analysis allows for greater confidence that significant results will generalize beyond 
the specific materials used and participants recruited (Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008; Gelman 
& Hill, 2007; Jaeger, 2008). This statistical approach was implemented using the lme4 package 
in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker 2015). To determine the significance of each effect, we 
compare a model that includes the relevant term in question (as well as all of the other factors 
that are not currently being investigated) to a model that does not include that term (but does 
include all of the other factors). The effect is taken to be significant if the fit of the model 
including the term differs significantly from the fit of the model that does not include that term 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). For simplicity and clarity, follow-up comparisons and 
effect sizes are included as a way of illustrating the patterns observed in the overall analysis. For 
each of the analyses we report, similar results were also obtained using the more traditional 
approach of relying on analyses of variance. The statistical code for running both sets of analyses 
is provided (along with the data and stimuli) at: https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness.  
 
Study 1 Results 
Preliminary Analyses. Participants were divided into three groups based on their 
responses to the happiness expertise items: (1) Non-researchers (n = 324), (2) Researchers (n = 
140), and (3) Experts (n = 129). On a scale from 1 (no knowledge of happiness research) to 20 
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(complete expertise on happiness) those in the Experts group had a mean well above the 
midpoint (M = 13.56; SD =2.19); those in the Researchers group had a mean below the midpoint 
(M= 7.26; SD =2.09); and those in the Non-researchers group had almost no knowledge of 
happiness research (M=3.71; SD = 1.20). There were no consistent effects of age, gender, 
education or SES the critical analyses in these studies. Accordingly, these variables are not 
discussed further, though the full analyses are available at 
https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness  
Primary Analyses. We first analyzed participants’ responses to the happiness attribution 
item in the between-subjects version of the study. 45 participants were excluded for failing to 
answer one of the three comprehension questions correctly. The remaining 269 participants’ 
responses were analyzed by comparing linear mixed effects models that treated Moral Value and 
Happiness Expertise as fixed factors and Agent as a random factor. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of Moral Value, Χ2 (1) = 28.71, p < .001. Planned comparisons revealed 
that participants rated the agents as happier in the morally good condition (M = 6.34, SD = 1.09) 
than in the morally bad condition (M = 5.44, SD =1.62), t(212.50) = -5.27, p < .001, d = 0.66. 
We did not observe any effects of Expertise or an Expertise x Moral Value interaction, p’s ≥ 
.591.1 
 To investigate whether the effect of Moral Value persisted when participants were made 
aware that the only difference in the scenarios was the moral value of the agent’s life, we next 
analyzed participant’s happiness attributions in the within-subjects version. 95 participants were 
excluded for failing to answer one of the six comprehension questions (three for each of the two 
vignettes) correctly. The remaining 184 participants’ responses were analyzed and again revealed 
                                                
1 Treating the research scale as a continuous variable rather than factoring participants into expertise groups does not 
change the pattern of results. 
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a main effect of Moral Value, Χ2 (1) = 48.65, p < .001, such that participants again rated the 
agents as happier in the morally good condition (M = 6.48, SD = 0.84) than in the morally bad 
condition (M = 5.63, SD =1.74), t(183) = 7.44, p < .001, d = 0.549. We did not observe any other 
main effects or interactions, p’s ≥ .645 (Fig.2).2 
 
Study 1 Discussion 
Taken together, the results of this study suggest that the influence of moral value on assessments 
of happiness is highly robust. Moral value influenced participants’ judgments whether the study 
was administered between-subjects or within-subjects, suggesting that at least some participants 
were willing to more reflectively endorse the relevance of evaluative considerations for 
happiness. More strikingly, this pattern persisted across all three groups of participants, whether 
they were untrained in scientific or philosophical study, highly trained in scientific or 
philosophical study, or even highly trained in the study of happiness itself. In sum, the impact of 
moral value on assessments of happiness is unlikely to be explained as a misunderstanding of the 
task or a simple error on the part of participants. Rather, the effect of moral value seems to 
reflect a robust aspect of how people ordinarily make assessments of happiness. 
 
Study 2: Bias or Distortion - Test 1 
While the previous results suggest that the influence of moral value is not due to a simple 
misunderstanding or lack of competence with the task, another plausible explanation is that the 
                                                
2 Including all participants, we continue to observe the key main effect of Moral Value, both in the between-subjects 
condition, Χ2 (1) = 51.24, p < .001, and in the within-subjects condition, Χ2 (1) = 133.98, p < .001.  Participants’ 
justifications for differences in their happiness assessments were coded as falling within one of four different 
categories: (1) the agents experienced different descriptive states (~48%), (2) one of the agents was disliked more by 
the participant (~14%), (3) morality was directly relevant to the agents’ happiness (~22%), or (4) other (~16%). We 
did not find a significant difference in the kinds of responses provided by Non-researchers, Researchers, and 
Experts, Χ2 (6) = 6.96, p = .143. All justifications, coding, and analysis are available at 
https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness 
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effect arises primarily from a motivational bias. In particular, it may be that participants found 
themselves reluctant to attribute positive qualities like happiness to people who they regarded as 
bad (Ditto, Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2009), or their assessments of the agent’s happiness is 
distorted by a desire to maintain a belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). Thus, even if moral 
evaluations do play a robust role in assessments of happiness, they still may not reflect genuine 
features of the ordinary concept of happiness.  
To pursue this possibility, we attempted to directly manipulate the degree to which 
participants viewed happiness as a genuinely good thing. To the extent that we are able to 
successfully change participants’ views on the desirability or value of happiness, we can then ask 
whether these changes are reflected in the degree to which moral value influences assessments of 
happiness. More specifically, if the effect in the previous study arose from a motivational bias, 
then we would expect this effect to decrease when participants are given evidence that happiness 
is not actually such a desirable or good thing. Alternatively, if the effect of morality on 
assessments of happiness reflects an aspect of the ordinary concept of happiness, then we would 
expect moral value to influence assessments of happiness regardless of the extent to which 
participants are thinking of happiness as a good or desirable property.   
Study 2 Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 125 adults (77 females, 3 unreported; Mage = 33.85, SDage= 12.12) from 
the United States recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Additional demographic 
information for this and all following studies can be found at 
https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness  
Measures 
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Happiness Attribution.  As in Study 1, participants rated their agreement with the 
statement “[Agent] is happy” on a 1 to 7 scale. 
Happiness Check. Three ‘happiness check’ items were assessed to examine whether we 
successfully changed people’s attitudes toward happiness. These included measuring beliefs 
about happiness, change in happiness beliefs, and self-reported subjective happiness. For 
happiness beliefs, participants rated the extent to which they agreed with the statement 
“Happiness is a good thing”. For change in happiness beliefs, participants reported whether or 
not this research had changed their original view of happiness. For self-reported happiness, 
participants self-reported their current happiness levels. All items were rated on 1 to 7 scale. 
Comprehension Check. To ensure that participants fully understood the information 
presented during the video lecture, participants were asked to report three new facts they learned 
about happiness. Participants provided written descriptions of three facts. 
Demographic items. Demographic items measured participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
education and socio-economic status (SES). 
Study 2 Procedure 
Participants first watched a brief (less than 3 minute) video-lecture (given by Author JG) based 
on actual scientific work on happiness (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Gruber, et al., 2011; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). The video lectures were similar in length and amount of content. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a ‘happiness is good’ condition in which they 
viewed a brief video lecture on studies suggesting that happiness is associated with good 
characteristics (creativity, prosociality, positive health outcomes) or a ‘happiness is bad’ 
condition in which they viewed a lecture on studies suggesting that happiness is associated with 
bad characteristics (selfishness, discrimination, negative health outcomes). Both conditions 
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portrayed information from actual scientific studies and were equated for length and 
presentation. (Transcripts of each lecture, and the video lecture itself can be found in the 
Supplementary Materials available at: https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness). Participants 
were instructed that they would be asked to report three facts they learned from the lecture after 
viewing it. They completed this comprehension check and also the happiness check items after 
finishing watching the video lecture. 
         Subsequently, participants read a vignette about an agent that described the agent’s life 
and psychological states. Participants were randomly assigned to read either about an agent 
living a morally good life or about an agent living a morally bad life. As in Study 1, the agent’s 
psychological states were identical in the two conditions: the agent was described as having high 
levels of positive affect, low levels of negative affect, and high levels of life satisfaction. After 
reading the vignette, participants completed the happiness attribution and demographic items. 
Study 2 Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
Participants’ responses to the comprehension check items were coded according to 
whether they were facts reported in the video lecture, and subsequent analyses were conducted 
only on participants who correctly provided three facts about happiness from the video lecture 
(94%; n = 117). We first examined the three manipulation checks to ensure that we successfully 
altered the extent to which participants believed that happiness is a good thing. Participants in the 
‘happiness is bad’ condition agreed significantly less with the claim that “Happiness is a good 
thing” (M = 5.23, SD = 1.16) than did participants in the ‘happiness is good condition’ (M = 
6.69, SD = 0.55), t(102.82) = -9.10, p< .001, d = 1.524. Participants also reported that they 
valued happiness significantly less in the happiness is bad condition (M = 3.80, SD = 0.99) than 
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in the happiness is good condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.10), t(116) = -6.71, p < .001, d = 1.254. 
Finally, participants were inclined to describe themselves as less happy in the happiness is bad 
condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.18) than in the happiness is good condition (M = 5.04, SD = 1.14), 
t(116) = -2.39, p = .019, d = 0.446. Taken together, these results suggest that we were able to 
successfully manipulate the extent to which participants perceived happiness as a good thing. 
After being exposed to research suggesting happiness may actually be bad, participants were 
more likely to disagree that happiness was actually a good thing, reported valuing happiness less, 
and were less inclined to describe themselves as happy. 
Primary Analyses. The critical question we can now ask is whether these changes in 
participants’ views about happiness influenced the extent to which moral value affected their 
happiness assessments. As in Study 1, there was a main effect of Moral Value F(1,114) = 78.95, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .409, such that participants judged agents living morally bad lives to be less happy 
(M = 3.88 , SD = 1.83) than agents living morally good lives (M = 6.27, SD = 1.04), t(85.38) = -
8.63, p < .001, d = 1.611. There was no significant main effect of Happiness Research, F(1,114) 
= 1.66, p = .200, ηp2 = .014, and critically, there was also no interaction between happiness 
research and moral value, F(1,114) = 0.30, p = .587, ηg2 = .003 (see Figure 3). 
 
Study 2 Discussion 
In brief, these results suggest that (1) we successfully manipulated the extent to which 
participants perceived happiness to be a good thing, but that (2) even when we decreased 
participants’ belief that happiness was good, they still showed the same influence of moral value 
on their assessments of happiness. This pattern is not predicted by an account on which 
morality’s effect on assessments of happiness is due to a motivational bias. By contrast, this 
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pattern would be expected if the effect of moral value reflected an aspect of the ordinary concept 
of happiness.  
Study 3: Bias or Distortion - Test 2  
One straightforward prediction of all motivational accounts is that the more people hold a 
negative attitude toward a given agent, the more they should be reluctant to regard an agent as 
happy. In other words, even among cases in which people regard the agent's life as morally bad, 
there should be an effect such that people are more reluctant to attribute happiness when they 
have a strongly negative attitude toward the agent than when they have just a slightly negative 
attitude. 
By contrast, this prediction would not necessarily fall out of theories according to which 
the concept of happiness is itself evaluative. Instead, the prediction would depend on the details 
of the theory. The core idea of an evaluative theory of happiness is just that moral considerations 
play some role in the criteria for determining whether a person is happy. One way to spell out 
such a theory would be to say that happiness attributions should be in some way proportional to 
moral goodness, with an agent being regarded as ever less happy as her life becomes ever less 
morally good. However, it would also be possible to spell out such a theory in other ways, such 
that moral goodness does play a role but happiness is not simply proportional to goodness. (For 
further discussion, see General Discussion.)  
To explore this issue, we manipulated the degree to which the agent's life was morally 
bad. Participants in both conditions received a vignette about an agent who had a morally bad 
life, but participants in one condition were told about an agent whose life was just slightly 
morally bad, while those in the other were told about an agent who was truly evil. The key 
question was whether participants would be more reluctant to attribute happiness to the evil 
21 
 
agent than to the agent whose life was just slightly morally bad. 
Study 3 Methods 
Participants 
To pretest the difference in the moral value of the agents’ lives, we recruited 50 
participants (27 females; Mage = 31.80, SDage = 9.73). We additionally recruited 201 adults in the 
main study (69 females; Mage = 30.75, SDage = 8.30) and asked them to evaluate the happiness of 
the agents. All participants were from the United States and again recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk.  
Measures 
Moral Value Pretest. Participants rated the moral value of the agent’s life on a scale 
from 1 (‘Most immoral life possible’) to 7 (‘Completely morally fine’).  
Happiness Assessment.  As in Study 1, participants rated their agreement with the 
statement “[Agent] is happy” on a 1 to 7 scale. 
Demographic Items. Demographic items measured participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
education and socio-economic status (SES). 
Study 3 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to read a brief vignette about one of two possible 
agents. The agent was either described as living a life that was slightly immoral (i.e., a shallow 
life that involved lying and using other people to get ahead) or as living a life that was 
fundamentally evil (i.e., a life dedicated to white supremacy and violent terrorism). In both cases, 
the agent was described as having the three psychological states associated with happiness: high 
levels of positive affect, low levels of negative affect, and high levels of life-satisfaction. As in 
the previous studies, the agent’s mental states were identical in the two conditions. (All stimuli, 
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data and analyses are available at: https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness). After reading the 
vignette, all participants completed the happiness assessment item and finally the demographic 
items.  
Study 3 Results 
We first compared participants’ moral judgments, which revealed that they believed the 
fundamentally evil agent to be living a much worse life (M = 5.85; SD = 1.32) than the slightly 
immoral agent (M = 4.29; SD = 1.40), t(48) = -4.05, p < .001, d = 1.15.   
Given this difference, we next compared participants’ assessments of happiness for the 
two agents and found that they actually judged that the fundamentally evil agent was more happy 
(M = 5.74; SD = 1.59) than the slightly immoral agent (M = 5.23; SD = 1.68), t(199) = -2.22, p = 
.028, d = 0.313 (see Figure 4). 
 
Study 3 Discussion 
To test between general motivational and specific conceptual explanations of the impact of 
morality, we asked whether increasing the extent to which participants held negative attitudes 
toward the agent also increased their disinclination to regard the agent as happy. The pattern of 
responses we observed strongly suggests the opposite. Participants actually regarded the 
fundamentally evil agent as significantly happier than the slightly immoral agent. This result 
complements the pattern observed in Study 2, and together they help to build a case against an 
explanation that appeals solely to general motivated cognition or just world beliefs. 
The obvious next question is how this puzzling result could be explained in terms of the 
structure of the concept of happiness. However, before offering an explanation that appeals to 
some specific structure of the concept of happiness, it is necessary to first determine whether the 
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concept of happiness should be understood as a descriptive or evaluative one (see Figure 1b and 
1c). If the concept of happiness turns out to be purely descriptive, then this result could be 
explained by suggesting that participants perceived the evil agent as having fewer negative 
psychological states (e.g., remorse or regret) than the slightly immoral agent. In contrast, if the 
concept of happiness turns out to be evaluative, then this result could instead be explained by 
suggesting that there is some value that was relevant to happiness that the evil agent satisfied 
more than the slightly immoral agent (e.g., having a life that is structured by a deeper meaning). 
Accordingly, we first turn to addressing the question of whether the folk concept of happiness is 
descriptive or evaluative. After doing so, we return to this question in the General Discussion 
and offer one way of understanding these puzzling results. 
 
Study 4a and 4b: Is The Effect Mediated by Changes in The Perception of Descriptive 
Psychological States? 
 
The first three studies provide evidence that participants’ assessments of happiness are affected 
by their moral evaluations in a way that is unlikely to be the result of a performance error or 
general motivated cognition. Even setting these explanations to one side, however, there are still 
two very different ways to explain morality’s impact. One possibility is that the ordinary 
concept, like the scientific understanding, is only concerned with the descriptive psychological 
states that an agent experiences, and that changes in the moral value of an agent’s life change 
whether the agent is understood as experiencing these states. An alternative possibility is that, 
unlike the scientific definition, the ordinary concept of the happiness is genuinely evaluative, and 
the moral value of an agent’s life is directly relevant to whether or not an agent is understood to 
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be happy. 
 Studies 4a and b provide two tests of the first possibility by asking whether the effect of 
morality can be explained by changes in the perception of the descriptive psychological states the 
agent is seen as experiencing.  
Study 4a did this by asking participants to complete two closely matched measures which 
asked participants either to assess whether the agent was happy or to assess whether the agent 
felt good. In both cases, participants read about an agent who was described as living a morally 
good or a morally bad life, and then were asked to indicate their agreement with a statement that 
either described the agent as being happy or feeling good.  
Study 4b instead did this by developing a novel measure that allowed participants to 
report, in a very general way, the extent to which they believed the agent experienced positive 
rather than negative psychological states. To do this, participants selected one of seven faces, 
which were generated through facial morphing such that the agent’s expression ranged from one 
of high negative affect to one of high positive affect (see Figure 6 for an example). Participants 
were again asked to read about an agent who was either living a morally good or bad life, and 
were then randomly assigned either to assess how the agent felt (on this new measure), or to 
assess how happy the agent was (using the same measure from previous studies). We 
additionally manipulated whether the agent’s psychological states were described as being 
positive overall or negative overall, which provided a way of testing whether the newly 
developed measure succeeded in tracking the agent’s descriptive psychological experience.  
Together, these studies provide convergent ways to compare the impact of moral 
evaluations across assessments of happiness and assessments of the descriptive psychological 
states the agent was perceived as experiencing. 
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Study 4a Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 203 adults (121 females, 1 unreported; Mage = 37.55, SDage = 13.38) 
from the United States again recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  
Measures 
Happiness Assessment.  Participants were asked to tell us whether they agreed or 
disagreed with a statement about the agent in the story they read. They then rated their agreement 
with a statement of the form “[Agent] is happy.” on a scale from 1 (‘Disagree’) to 7 (‘Agree’). 
 Affect Assessment.  Similarly, participants were asked to tell us whether they agreed or 
disagreed with a statement about what the agent in the story felt like. They then rated their 
agreement with a statement of the form “[Agent] feels good.” on a scale from 1 (‘Disagree’) to 7 
(‘Agree’). 
Demographic Items. Demographic items measured participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
education and socio-economic status (SES). 
Study 4a Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to read a brief vignette about one of four possible 
agents (mother, janitor, nurse, or uncle). For each agent, participants were randomly assigned to 
either a “morally good” or “morally bad” condition. This resulted in a total of eight different 
vignettes. In all cases, the agent was described as experiencing mental states that satisfy the 
descriptive definition of happiness (high levels of positive affect, low levels of negative affect, 
and high levels of life-satisfaction). The agent’s mental states were phrased in a parallel manner 
across all vignettes so that only the specific agent name and personal pronouns were changed. 
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(All stimuli, data and analyses are available at: https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness).After 
reading the vignette, all participants completed either the affect assessment item or the happiness 
assessment item (administered between-subjects). Finally, participants completed the 
demographic items.  
Study 4a Results 
We observed a main effect of Moral Value, Χ2(1) = 4.89, p = .027, and a marginal effect of 
Assessment Type Χ2(1) = 3.04, p = .081. Critically, however, these effects were qualified by a 
significant Moral Value x Assessment Type interaction, Χ2 (1) = 5.35, p = .021. For assessments 
of happiness, participants rated the agents as happier when they were living a morally good life 
(M = 6.59, SD = 0.88) than when they were living a morally bad life (M = 5.87, SD = 1.70), 
t(78.47) = -2.73, p = .008, d = 0.530 . For assessments of affect, however, participants rated the 
agent as having similar affective states whether that agent was living a morally good life (M = 
6.60, SD = 0.65) or a morally bad life (M = 6.57, SD = 0.81), t(97) = -0.19, p = .847, d = 0.039 
(see Figure 5).   
 
Study 4b Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 403 adults (159 females, 1 unreported; Mage = 29.24, SDage = 8.98) from 
the United States again recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  
Measures 
Happiness Assessment.  As in Study 1, participants rated their agreement with the 
statement “[Agent] is happy” on a 1 to 7 scale. 
  Emotion Assessment.  Participants were told that we were interested in their own 
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thoughts about how the agent feels. They were then asked to tell us how they thought the agent 
felt on a scale of morphed faces from 1 (a photo of a face expressing high negative affect) to 7 (a 
photo of a face expressing high positive affect). Four versions of this seven-face scale were 
created; one for each of the four agents participants read about. The endpoint photos of the scale 
were taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist, Flykt & Öhman, 1998) 
and the middle five facial morphs were generated using FantaMorph 5 facial morphing software 
(See Figure 5). 
Comprehension Check. To ensure that participants read the vignettes carefully, they 
were asked to summarize the life of the person they read about. 
Demographic Items. Demographic items measured participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
education and socio-economic status (SES). 
Study 4b Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to read a brief vignette about one of four possible agents 
(mother, janitor, nurse, or uncle). For each agent, participants were randomly assigned to either a 
“morally good” or “morally bad” condition. For each of these eight possible scenarios, 
participants were randomly assigned to read either about an agent experiencing positive mental 
states or about an agent experiencing negative mental states. This resulted in a total of sixteen 
different vignettes. In the positive mental states condition, the agents’ mental states were 
described as having the three critical ingredients of happiness: high levels of positive affect, low 
levels of negative affect, and high levels of life-satisfaction. In the negative mental states 
condition, the agents’ mental states were described as lacking these three critical ingredients: the 
agent had low levels of positive affect, high levels of negative affect, and low levels of life-
satisfaction. As in the previous studies, the agent’s mental states were phrased in a parallel 
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manner across all vignettes so that only the specific agent name and personal pronouns were 
changed. (All stimuli, data and analyses are available at: 
https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness). After reading the vignette, all participants 
completed either the affect assessment item or the happiness assessment item (administered 
between-subjects). Finally, participants completed the comprehension check question and 
demographic items.  
Study 4b Results 
We first tested whether the effect of morality was specific to happiness. Critically, we observed a 
significant Moral Value x Assessment Type interaction, Χ2 (1) = 8.01, p = .005 (see Figure 6). 
For assessments of happiness, participants rated the agents as happier when they were living a 
morally good life (M = 4.11, SD = 2.61) than when they were living a morally bad life (M = 3.29, 
SD = 2.46), t(197) = -2.29, p = .023, d = 0.325. For assessments of affect, however, participants 
rated the agent as having similar affective states whether that agent was living a morally good 
life (M = 4.57, SD = 2.18) or a morally bad life (M = 4.21, SD = 2.19), p = .240, d = 0.165.    
We also observed a Moral Value x Psychological State interaction effect, Χ2 (1) = 5.32, p 
= .021, such that the agent’s life value had a larger effect on assessments when the agent was 
experiencing positive psychological states, t(141.05) = -4.872, p < .001, d = 0.686, than when the 
agent was experiencing negative psychological states t(199) = -1.76, p = .080, d = 0.249.  In 
addition, we observed an Assessment Type x Psychological State interaction effect, Χ2 (1) = 
12.61, p < .001, such that the agent’s psychological states had a somewhat bigger effect on 
assessments of happiness, t(154.87) = 26.92, p < .001, d = 3.846, than on assessments of general 
emotion, t(186.43) = 24.79, p < .001, d = 3.489. As expected, we also observed main effects of 
Moral Value, Χ2 (1) = 24.22, p < .001, Psychological States, Χ2 (1) = 611.83, p < .001, and 
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Assessment Type, Χ2 (2) = 30.57, p < .001. There was no three-way Moral Value x 
Psychological State x Assessment Type interaction, Χ2 (2) = 2.24, p = .135. 
 
Study 4a and 4b Discussion 
Moral value significantly impacted the extent to which participants understood the agent to be 
happy, but did not similarly affect the descriptive psychological states the agent was perceived as 
experiencing. This pattern suggests that moral evaluations are not affecting assessments of 
happiness solely by changing the descriptive psychological states the agent is perceived as 
experiencing. Instead, it may be that the impact of moral value arises because the ordinary 
concept of happiness is evaluative and provides a specific role for moral value. We pursue this 
possibility in a final study. 
 
Study 5: The Role of Moral Value in The Ordinary Concept of Happiness 
If moral judgments actually play a role in the criteria governing people's concept of 
happiness, then the impact of morality on happiness attributions should exhibit a specific pattern 
that differs sharply from the impact of factors that are not part of the criteria. To see this, 
consider for example the impact of being very poor on judgments of whether someone is happy. 
While being wealthy is not one of the criteria governing people's concept of happiness, it may 
still be the case that believing that someone is very poor will make you less likely to think that 
person is happy. Such an effect presumably occurs because believing a person is poor also leads 
participants to imagine that this person is unlikely to meet the criteria that actually are part of the 
concept of happiness (e.g., experiencing high positive affect and low negative affect). Thus, if 
participants found out that the person did experience high positive affect and low negative affect 
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even though she is poor, then the impact of being poor on happiness attributions should be 
screened off. By contrast, factors that actually play a role in the criteria governing the concept of 
happiness should exhibit a different pattern: even if participants are explicitly told about the 
agent's psychological states, the impact of these factors should remain. We investigate these 
possibilities with respect to the impact of moral judgments (see Figure 1c). 
To ask whether the impact of morality differs in this way from the impact of other 
factors, we compared a manipulation of non-moral aspects of an agent's life (e.g., having a good 
vs. bad job) with a manipulation of moral aspects (e.g., caring for vs. harming sick children). 
Given the previous research on the topic (King & Napa, 1998), as well as the results of the 
preceding studies, we expect that both moral and non-moral factors are likely to impact 
assessments of happiness in the absence of information about the agents’ descriptive 
psychological states. The key question is whether these effects will be differentially reduced 
when explicit information about the agents’ psychological states is provided.  
Study 5 Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 400 adults (182 females; Mage = 32.39, SDage = 10.25) from the United 
States again recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  
Measures 
Happiness Assessment.  As in the previous studies, participants were asked to tell us 
whether they agreed or disagreed with a statement about the agent in the story they read. They 
then rated their agreement with a statement of the form “[Agent] is happy.” on a scale from 1 
(‘Completely disagree’) to 7 (‘Completely agree’). 
Demographic Items. Demographic items measured participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
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education and socio-economic status (SES). 
Study 5 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the moral value condition or the non-moral value 
condition. Within the moral value condition, participants were randomly assigned either to read 
about three agents who were described as living morally good lives (helping disabled students, 
caring for sick children, taking care of a young relative), or to read about three agents who were 
described as living morally bad lives (stealing from students, harming sick children, molesting a 
young relative). Within the non-moral value condition, participants were randomly assigned 
either to read about three agents who were living lives that were good in non-moral ways (being 
very wealthy, having a very comfortable job, living in an exciting area), or to read about three 
agents who were living lives that were bad in non-moral ways (being very poor, having a terrible 
job, living in a remote and desolate area). In addition, participants were randomly assigned either 
to receive or to not receive explicit information about the agents’ psychological states. In all 
cases where the agents’ psychological states were described, the agents were described as 
experiencing the three psychological states associated with happiness: high levels of positive 
affect, low levels of negative affect, and high levels of life-satisfaction.  
Overall, this resulted in a mixed design with morality (moral vs. non-moral), value (good 
vs. bad) and mental state information (present vs. absent) as between-subjects factors and the 
three agents (a young nurse, a forty-five-year-old man, a school janitor) as a within-subjects 
factor. (All stimuli, data and analyses are available at: 
https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness). After reading each vignette, participants completed 
the happiness assessment item for that agent, and after assessing the happiness of all three 
agents, participants completed the demographic items.  
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Study 5 Results 
An analysis of participants’ assessments of happiness revealed the key three-way interaction 
effect between Morality, Life Value and Psychological Information, Χ2(9) = 47.72, p < .001 (see 
Figure 7). We decomposed this interaction by looking separately at the moral and non-moral 
value conditions.  
Considering the Moral Value condition first: when no information was provided about 
the agents’ descriptive psychological states, participants reported that the agent was significantly 
happier when leading a life that was morally good (M = 4.65, SD = 0.83) than when leading a 
life that was morally bad (M = 2.20, SD = 1.20), t(85.23) = -11.83, p < .001, d = 2.38. Moreover, 
even when information was provided that the agent had positive descriptive psychological states, 
participants continued to report that the agent was much happier when leading a morally good 
life (M = 6.29, SD = 0.62), than when leading a morally bad life (M = 4.93, SD = 1.94), t(59.13) 
= -4.70, p , .001, d = 0.94.  
This pattern in the Non-Moral value condition was quite different. When no information 
about the agents’ descriptive psychological states was provided, participants reported that the 
agent was much happier when leading a life that was non-morally good (M = 5.76, SD = 0.75), 
than when leading a life that was non-morally bad (M = 2.57, SD = 1.18), t(84.48) = -16.26, p < 
.001, d = 3.22. In sharp contrast, however, when information was provided that the agent had 
positive descriptive psychological states, participants no longer reported that the agent was 
happier when leading a life that was non-morally good (M = 6.49, SD = 0.89), than when leading 
a life that was non-morally bad (M = 6.20, SD = 0.93), t(98) = -1.61, p = .111, d = 0.32. 
 
Study 5 Discussion 
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The impact of moral value on happiness assessments differed sharply from the impact of non-
moral value. Non-moral value impacted assessments of happiness in the absence of information 
about the agent’s psychological states, but this effect was eliminated when information about the 
agents’ psychological states was made explicit. This pattern suggests that non-moral value 
initially impacted assessments of happiness by altering whether or not the agent was perceived as 
experiencing the descriptive criteria for happiness, and accordingly, providing this information 
explicitly screened off the impact of non-moral value on assessments of happiness.  
The impact of moral value exhibited a different overall pattern. Consistent with previous 
research (King & Napa, 1998), the impact of moral value was greatest when no information was 
given about the agents’ psychological states, suggesting that people typically exhibit an 
inferential connection between happiness and morality. In contrast to non-moral value, however, 
the impact of morality was not completely screened off when information about the agents’ 
psychological states was provided. Thus, these results both provide a conceptual replication of 
previous findings on the relationship between happiness and morality (King & Napa, 1998), and 
additionally demonstrate that moral value is special in that it seems to serve as one of the 
independent criteria that govern the ordinary concept of happiness (see Figure 1c). 
 
General Discussion 
Five studies explored the role of morality in the ordinary concept of happiness, and 
collectively shed light on the question of why moral judgments affect ordinary assessments of 
happiness. Study 1 demonstrated the robustness of the effect of moral value, showing that it 
arises in expert researchers, even in a within-subject design. Studies 2 and 3 then provided 
evidence that the effect of morality on judgments of happiness is unlikely to be explained by 
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general motivational biases or beliefs in a just world. Lastly, Studies 4 and 5 tested whether the 
effect of morality on assessments of happiness occurs indirectly, through changes in the 
psychological states the agent is perceived as experiencing, or directly, suggesting that morality 
is actually one of the criteria of the ordinary concept of happiness. Study 4 revealed that the 
impact of moral judgments cannot be explained by changes in the perception of descriptive 
psychological states. Study 5 provided evidence that moral value, unlike non-moral value, has a 
direct impact on assessments of happiness, suggesting that it is one of the criteria that govern the 
ordinary concept of happiness. 
 While previous research demonstrated that moral judgments affect assessments of 
happiness (e.g., Phillips et al., 2011), the present results provide a deeper understanding of why 
this is the case. Across five studies, we considered three explanations of the effect of morality: 
(1) biases or performance errors, (2) mediation through descriptive psychological states, and (3) 
an evaluative folk concept of happiness. While these first two explanations are well-studied and 
receive support from previous research (King & Napa, 1998; Lerner, 1980), our studies provide 
evidence for the third explanation. Above and beyond performance errors or changes in 
descriptive psychological states, we find that morality has a direct impact on ordinary 
assessments of happiness. 
Happiness and the Pervasive Impact of Morality 
Previous research has found that, in addition to happiness, many others kinds judgments 
are also impacted by morality, including judgments about knowledge, intentional action, 
causation, and freedom among others (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Knobe, 2003; Kominsky, et 
al., 2015; Leslie, et al., 2006; Samland, et al., 2016; Phillips, et al., 2015; Young & Phillips, 
2011). Thus, a natural question arises as to whether the effect we have been investigating is 
35 
 
related to these previous findings. 
One intriguing possibility is that the theories that have been developed to explain these 
various effects could also be used to account for the impact of morality on assessments of 
happiness. In fact, a number of researchers have recently been developing accounts that can be 
extended to many of the judgments that are impacted by morality (Adams & Steadman, 2004; 
Alfano, Beebe & Robinson, 2012; Driver, 2008a; 2008b; Phillips et al., 2015; Uttich & 
Lombrozo, 2010). However, all of these accounts were developed to explain effects that showed 
precisely the opposite pattern from the one exhibited by assessments of happiness. For example, 
judgments that an outcome is morally bad lead people to judge that the agent more intended the 
outcome, was more in favor of it, more decided to bring it about, and so forth (Pettit & Knobe, 
2009). In contrast, a judgment that an agent acted immorally leads people to judge that an agent 
was less happy. Thus, it difficult to see how the theories designed to explain those earlier 
findings could be extended to account for the present effects.  
Given the difficulty faced by extant proposals for unifying morality’s influence, a 
plausible alternative possibility is that the effect of morality on judgments of happiness may be 
best explained by specific features of the concept of happiness. If this is correct, then a better 
understanding this particular effect we have been investigating will require a better 
understanding of concepts that involve both evaluative and descriptive criteria.  
The Ordinary Concept of Happiness 
We have argued that the effects observed in the present studies are to be explained in terms of 
the structure of the concept of happiness itself. In other words, we suggest that the impact of 
moral considerations is best explained by suggesting that the concept of happiness is not a purely 
descriptive one but actually involves a role for moral factors.  
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This claim immediately opens up a host of new questions. It seems clear that the concept 
is associated with certain purely descriptive features (concerning the agent's psychological 
states), but the present studies suggest that it is also associated with certain deeper values 
(concerning the moral status of the agent's life). What then is the relationship between these 
aspects of the concept?  
While further studies will be required before proposing any definite account, we want to 
suggest some promising avenues for future research. First, we suggest that a good way to make 
sense of the puzzling characteristics of the concept of happiness might be to turn to more general 
theories of concepts. Presumably, the concept of happiness is not completely sui generis. Thus, if 
we look to a broader class of concepts and try to develop a more general account of how they 
work, we may be able to gain some valuable insight into the concept of happiness in particular.  
It does seem that certain other concepts show a similar duality between descriptive 
features and deeper values. As an example, consider the concept scientist. People seem to 
associate this concept with various descriptive features (running experiments, doing statistics, 
developing theories). Yet it also seems that people associate the concept with a deeper value. 
Consider a physics professor who clearly displays all the descriptive features but who does not 
seem to be involved in a genuine quest for truth. There seems to be some sense in which such a 
person would clearly count as a scientist, but all the same, people tend to say that there is a 
deeper sense in which she is not truly a scientist at all (Knobe, Prasada & Newman, 2013). 
Conversely, consider a child who has had no formal training in experimentation, statistics, or 
theory construction, but who is deeply interested in the underlying truths of how things operate 
and seeks to understand them. There again seems to be some sense in which the child clearly 
would not count as a scientist, but another deeper sense in which the child truly does seem to be 
37 
 
a scientist. Existing studies show that this sort of pattern arises for a variety of different concepts, 
including not only scientist but also friend, soldier, poem as well as psychological state concepts 
like love (Knobe, Prasada & Newman, 2013).  
Within existing research, concepts of this general type have been referred to as 'dual 
character concepts' (Knobe et al., 2013). What makes such concepts distinctive is the fact that 
each such concept seems to be associated with two different criteria. On one hand, there are 
certain purely descriptive features. On the other, there is a deeper value. Both of these criteria 
seem to play a role in people's application of the concept. (For different approaches to 
understanding these different criteria and their interrelations, see Leslie, 2015; Del Pinal & 
Reuter, forthcoming; Buckwalter, Rose & Turri, 2015.)  
One possibility is that the pattern of judgments we have observed for the concept of 
happiness can be understood as just one instance of this far more general phenomenon. People 
associate the concept of happiness with certain purely descriptive features (positive affect, lack 
of negative affect, life satisfaction), but they also seem to associate the concept with certain 
deeper values. When an agent displays all of the descriptive features but fails to embody the 
deeper values, experimental participants tend to show some reluctance to say that the agent is 
truly happy.  
If this approach is broadly on the right track, a key task for future research will be to say 
something more about which specific deeper values people associate with the concept of 
happiness. Given the results of Experiment 3, where people judged an evil agent to be happier 
than a slightly immoral agent, it cannot be that the only value that is relevant to happiness is 
simply a matter of living a life with the lowest possible degree of moral wrongness. Thus, the 
relevant value must extend beyond a simple measure of moral goodness vs. badness, even if it is 
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related to morality in some way or another. To illustrate with just one example, it could be that 
the relevant value is a matter of having a life that is truly meaningful (for more on 
meaningfulness, see, Wolf, 2010). In investigating this question, future research could also draw 
on extant evaluative theories of happiness, which do involve moral considerations but are not 
simply a matter of minimizing the total number of immoral actions (Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002; 
Foot, 2001; Kraut, 1979). 
Further research could explore this issue on two different levels. On one hand, such 
research could look to the signature properties of dual character concepts more generally and ask 
whether the concept of happiness shows these properties. On the other, it could try to work out a 
more detailed dual character account of the concept of happiness in particular and then put that 
account to the test directly.  
Implications for the Science of Happiness 
 Lastly, it is important to consider how the present results may bear on the scientific study 
of happiness. In light of these results, one response would be to conclude that scientists need to 
revise their definition of happiness, so that it is in line with the ordinary concept. However, we 
think this would be a mistake. It is not hard to see why when one begins to consider other 
analogous cases where technical definitions diverge from ordinary concepts. Consider, for 
example, the technical understanding of preference in economics. Now suppose that studies 
showed that the ordinary folk concept of preference diverges from this technical definition. 
Clearly, it would be a mistake for economists to revise their definition in light of these results, 
and doing so would disrupt the progress that has been made in economics. Similarly, we think it 
would be a mistake for happiness researchers to revise their technical definition of happiness in 
light of the present results (e.g., by including moral evaluations of the agent’s life). In both cases, 
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the technical definitions play an important theoretical role within these disciplines and need not 
be aligned with the ordinary concepts. 
 At the same time, the present results may bear on the scientific research on happiness in 
an importantly different way. A number of recent scientific discoveries about happiness have 
been regarded as highly counterintuitive or even confusing by non-specialists. For example, a 
number of studies have suggested that having children does not lead people to be happier 
(Marini, 1980), and may actually decrease their happiness (Evenson & Simon, 2005; Glenn & 
McLanahan, 1982; Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; LeMasters, 1957). 
These findings have been met with some skepticism, provoking media coverage with titles like, 
“Children don’t make you happy, says expert who doesn’t have any” (“Children don’t make you 
happy”, 2009). To take another example, recent research has also suggested that happiness is 
positively related to traits like selfishness (Tan & Forgas, 2010), a lack of empathy (Devlin, 
Zaki, Ong & Gruber, 2014), and risky behavior like alcohol consumption, binge eating and drug 
use (Cyders & Smith, 2008; Martin et al., 2002). Non-specialists have similarly found these 
discoveries highly counterintuitive, as is well illustrated by the title one article: “Happiness and 
selfishness: A paradox” (Vedantam, 2010).  
The present studies allow us to understand why non-specialists may have this sort of a 
reaction. If these findings are interpreted in terms of the folk concept of happiness, then they are 
in fact highly surprising. After all, the presence of traits like selfishness or a lack of empathy 
would suggest that one would be unlikely to be experiencing happiness as characterized in the 
folk concept. However, when one instead understands that these findings are actually about 
happiness as it has been defined by psychologists (a combination of high positive affect, low 
negative affect, and high life-satisfaction), these findings cease to be as counterintuitive. In this 
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way, the present studies may help to clarify how findings such as these can be most effectively 
communicated to non-specialists. 
Directions for Future Research 
 The present studies point to two separate avenues for future research. One way to extend 
the current findings would be to pursue research that continues to focus on the ordinary concept 
of happiness and furthers our understanding of how people understand what it means to be 
happy. At the same time, our findings suggest that another fruitful avenue would be to further 
investigate what this effect can reveal about evaluative concepts and the influence of morality on 
non-moral judgments. While these two lines of research can be pursued separately, each should 
also deepen our understanding of the other. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. (a) Schematic depiction in which moral evaluations affect assessments of happiness by 
giving rise to performance errors. (b) Schematic depiction in which morality indirectly affects 
assessments of happiness by changing the perception of descriptive psychological states. (c) 
Schematic depiction in which morality is directly relevant to the ordinary concept of happiness, 
independent of changes in the perception of descriptive psychological states. 
 
Figure 2. Participants’ agreement that an agent is happy as a function of the participants’ level of 
expertise and the moral value of the agent’s life, which was manipulated both between-subjects 
(left) and within-subjects (right). Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
 
Figure 3. Participants’ agreement that agents living morally bad (dark bars) and morally good 
(light bars) lives are happy, for participants who were presented with research indicating that 
happiness is bad (left) or good (right). Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
 
Figure 4. Participants’ assessments of the moral value of the agents’ lives (left) and their 
happiness (right) as a function of the whether the agent was described as being slightly morally 
bad (dark bars) or being fundamentally evil (light bars). Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
 
Figure 5. Participants’ happiness assessments (left) and the emotion assessment (right) as a 
function of the whether the agent was living a morally good (light bars) or morally bad (dark 
barks) life. Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
 
Figure 6. Participants’ happiness assessments (left) and emotion assessments (right) as a function 
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of the whether the agent had positively or negatively valenced psychological states and whether 
the agent was living a morally good (light bars) or morally bad (dark barks) life. Error bars 
indicate +/- 1 SE. 
 
Figure 7. Happiness assessments of agents living lives that were either morally good or bad (left 
panel) or non-morally good or bad (right panel) and for whom participants were either given 
information about the agent’s positive psychological states (right-hand side of each panel) or not 
(right-hand side of each panel). Dark bars indicated that agent was described as having a bad life; 
light bars indicate the agent was described as having a good life. Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
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 Appendix 
Vignettes from Study 1 
 
Agent 1: morally good condition 
 
Tom always enjoys his job as a janitor at a local community college. What he likes most about 
his job is how it gives him a chance to see his wife who is attending the community college. 
Almost every single day Tom feels good and generally experiences a lot of pleasant emotions. In 
fact, it is very rare that he would ever feel negative emotions like sadness or loneliness. When 
Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he feels highly satisfied with 
the way he lives.     
 
The reason Tom feels this way is that every day he takes the handicapped students from class to 
class and talks with them about how they are doing and whether they are experiencing any 
problems. Each night as he's going to sleep, he thinks about the children he will be helping the 
next day. 
 
Agent 1: morally bad condition 
 
Tom always enjoys his job as a janitor at a local community college. What he likes most about 
his job is how it gives him a chance to meet the young female students who are attending the 
community college.  Almost every single day Tom feels good and generally experiences a lot of 
pleasant emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever feel negative emotions like sadness 
or loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he feels 
highly satisfied with the way he lives.   
 
The reason Tom feels this way is that every day he goes from locker to locker and steals 
belongings from the students and re-sells these belongings to buy himself alcohol. Each night as 
he's going to sleep, he thinks about the things he will be stealing the next day.  
 
Agent 2: morally good condition 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. Almost every single day 
Sarah feels good and generally experiences a lot of pleasant emotions. In fact, it is very rare that 
she would ever feel negative emotions like sadness or loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her 
life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she feels highly satisfied with the way she lives.         
 
The reason Sarah feels this way is that she helps the sick children by giving them vitamins that 
taste like gummy bears. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have been helped by her, 
but she likes to think about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Agent 2: morally bad condition 
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After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. Almost every single day 
Sarah feels good and generally experiences a lot of pleasant emotions. In fact, it is very rare that 
she would ever feel negative emotions like sadness or loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her 
life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she feels highly satisfied with the way she lives.       
 
The reason Sarah feels this way is that she poisons the sick children by giving them vitamins that 
have pesticides inside of them. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have died because 
of her, but she likes to think about it when she falls asleep at night.        
 
Agent 3: morally good condition 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta with his family. One of 
his favorite things is when his niece comes over to play with his kids. Almost every single day 
Garrett feels good and generally experiences a lot of pleasant emotions. In fact, it is very rare 
that he would ever feel negative emotions like sadness or loneliness. When Garrett thinks about 
his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he feels highly satisfied with the way he lives.         
 
The reason Garrett feels this way is that when his niece comes over to spend the night, Garrett 
reads to his niece. After that, sometimes they all talk about what they did that day and what they 
want to be when they grow up. Afterward, Garrett likes to think about what happened that night 
as he falls asleep 
 
Agent 3: morally bad condition 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta with his family. One of 
his favorite things is when his niece comes over to play with his kids. Almost every single day 
Garrett feels good and generally experiences a lot of pleasant emotions. In fact, it is very rare 
that he would ever feel negative emotions like sadness or loneliness. When Garrett thinks about 
his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he feels highly satisfied with the way he lives.       
 
The reason Garrett feels this way is that when his niece comes over to spend the night, Garrett 
pressures her to have sex with him. After that, they all talk about what they did that day and what 
they want to be when they grow up. Afterward, Garrett likes to think about what happened that 
night as he falls asleep. 
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Vignettes from Study 2 
 
Morally good condition 
 
Maria is the mother of three children who all really love her. In fact, they couldn’t imagine 
having a better mom. Maria usually stays pretty busy taking care of her children. She often finds 
herself rushing from one birthday party to the next, and is always going to pick up some 
groceries or buy school supplies. While Maria has been preoccupied with her children, she still 
makes an effort to be nice and spend time with her old friends. Almost every night she ends up 
helping her children or planning something for her children’s future.                    
 
Day to day, Maria usually feels excited and really enjoys whatever she is doing. When she 
reflects on her life, she also feels great. She can’t think of anything else in the world that she 
would want to spend her time doing and feels like the success she’s had is definitely worth 
whatever sacrifices she has made.       
 
Morally bad condition 
 
Maria wants to live the life of a celebrity in L.A. In fact, she has even started trying to date a few 
famous people. Maria usually works hard to become popular. She often finds herself rushing 
from one social gathering to the next, and is always going to pick up some alcohol or a dress. 
Maria is so preoccupied with becoming popular that she is no longer concerned with being 
honest or nice to her old friends unless they know someone famous. Almost every night she ends 
up drinking or partying with famous people she wants to be like.                    
 
Day to day, Maria usually feels excited and really enjoys whatever she is doing. When she 
reflects on her life, she also feels great. She can’t think of anything else in the world that she 
would want to spend her time doing and feels like the success she’s had is definitely worth 
whatever sacrifices she has made. 
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Vignettes from Study 3 
 
Morally bad condition  
 
Maria is a mother of three children, who wants to live the life of a celebrity in L.A. In fact, she 
has even started trying to date a few famous people. Maria usually works hard to become 
popular. She often finds herself rushing from one social gathering to the next and is always going 
to pick up some alcohol or a dress. 
  
Maria is completely preoccupied with becoming popular. She is no longer concerned with being 
honest or nice to her old friends unless they know someone famous. Almost every night she ends 
up drinking or partying with famous people she wants to be like. 
  
Almost every single day Maria is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Morally evil condition 
 
Maria is part of a violent terrorist group called White Nation. From an extremely young age, she 
has believed that only white people are good and that all black people should be killed or locked 
away in prisons. Every day, she is busy working with the other members of her group to make 
sure this happens. They are currently plotting to blow up a number of civil rights museums and 
black churches around the country. 
  
Maria is completely preoccupied with her goal, and only talks with white people who share her 
beliefs. Almost every night, she ends up talking with the other white supremacists about how to 
take back their country and eliminate or imprison everyone who is not white. 
  
Almost every single day Maria is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
  
61 
 
Vignettes from Study 4a 
 
Agent 1: Morally good condition with positive psychological states  
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. 
 
Sarah stays incredibly busy all day helping the many sick children who depend on her for their 
medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to help all of them. Every day she 
carefully measures how much medicine she will give each child, and then watches to make sure 
the child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have been helped by her, but 
she thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 1: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. 
 
Sarah stays incredibly busy all day poisoning the many sick children who depend on her for their 
medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to poison all of them. Every day she 
carefully measures how much poison she will give each child, and then watches to make sure the 
child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have been killed by her, but she 
thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 2: Morally good condition with positive psychological states 
 
Maria is the mother of three children who all really love her. In fact, they couldn’t imagine 
having a better mom. Maria usually stays pretty busy taking care of her children. She often finds 
herself rushing from one birthday party to the next, visiting friends important to her children. 
 
While Maria has been preoccupied with her children, she still makes an effort to be nice and 
spend time with her old friends. Almost every night she ends up helping her children or planning 
something for her children’s future. 
 
Almost every single day Maria is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
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loneliness. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 2: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states 
 
Maria is a mother of three children, who wants to live the life of a celebrity in L.A. In fact, she 
has even started trying to date a few famous people. Maria usually works hard to become 
popular. She often finds herself rushing from one social gathering to the next and is always going 
to pick up some alcohol or a dress. 
 
Maria is completely preoccupied with becoming popular. She is no longer concerned with being 
honest or nice to her old friends unless they know someone famous. Almost every night she ends 
up drinking or partying with famous people she wants to be like. 
 
Almost every single day Maria is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 3: Morally good condition with positive psychological states 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local community college. His job is very busy, but he meets many different 
people attending the college. 
  
Every day Tom takes the autistic and handicapped students from class to class and talks with 
them about how they are doing and whether they are experiencing any problems. Tom always 
wonders whether he could be doing more to help these students get through their day without 
struggling, and to fit in with their peers. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about how hard it is for 
these students, who end up getting bullied or having to leave the college. 
 
Almost every single day Tom is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
 
Agent 3: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local community college. His job is very busy, but he meets many different 
people attending the college. 
    
Every day after school Tom goes from locker to locker and steals belongings from the students 
and re-sells these belongings to buy himself alcohol. He occasionally puts stolen items in black 
students’ lockers so that they're blamed for the thefts. Tom always wonders whether he could be 
stealing more. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about how hard it is for these students, who end 
up getting bullied or having to leave the college. 
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Almost every single day Tom is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
 
Agent 4: Morally good condition with positive psychological states 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta. 
     
A few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her parents passed away. Almost every night, 
she asks him to read long books to her late at night so that she can fall asleep. Garrett always 
wonders if he could be doing more and debates what kind of effect his actions will have on his 
niece's life. Often, they also talk about what she did that day and the feelings she's had since her 
parents died. 
 
Almost every single day Garrett is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
 
Agent 4: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states  
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta. 
     
A few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her parents passed away. Almost every night, 
he pressures her to have sex with him late at night. Garrett always wonders what kind of effect 
his action will have on his niece's life, but then reminds himself that he's the only reason she's 
not homeless. Often, they also talk about what she did that day and the feelings she's had since 
her parents died. 
 
Almost every single day Garrett is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
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Vignettes from Study 4b 
 
Agent 1: Morally good condition with positive psychological states  
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. 
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
The reason Sarah feels this way is that she stays incredibly busy all day helping the many sick 
children who depend on her for their medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to 
help all of them. Every day she carefully measures how much medicine she will give each child, 
and then watches to make sure the child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many 
children have been helped by her, but she thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Agent 1: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. 
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
The reason Sarah feels this way is that she stays incredibly busy all day poisoning the many sick 
children who depend on her for their medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to 
poison all of them. Every day she carefully measures how much poison she will give each child, 
and then watches to make sure the child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many 
children have been killed by her, but she thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Agent 1: Morally good condition with negative psychological states  
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. 
  
Almost every single day Sarah is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly unsatisfied with the way she lives. 
 
The reason Sarah feels this way is that she stays incredibly busy all day helping the many sick 
children who depend on her for their medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to 
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help all of them. Every day she carefully measures how much medicine she will give each child, 
and then watches to make sure the child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many 
children have been helped by her, but she thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Agent 1: Morally bad condition with negative psychological states 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital and sees 
many different children each day. This is the job she has always wanted. 
  
Almost every single day Sarah is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly unsatisfied with the way she lives. 
 
The reason Sarah feels this way is that she stays incredibly busy all day poisoning the many sick 
children who depend on her for their medication. She often wonders if she will poison all of 
them. Every day she carefully measures how much poison she will give each child, and then 
watches to make sure the child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have 
been killed by her, but she thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Agent 2: Morally good condition with positive psychological states 
 
Maria is the mother of three children who all really love her. In fact, they couldn’t imagine 
having a better mom. Maria usually stays pretty busy taking care of her children. She often finds 
herself rushing from one birthday party to the next, visiting friends important to her children. 
 
Almost every single day Maria is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
The reason Maria feels this way is that while Maria has been preoccupied with her children, she 
still makes an effort to be nice and spend time with her old friends. Almost every night she ends 
up helping her children or planning something for her children’s future. 
 
Agent 2: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states 
 
Maria wants to live the life of a celebrity in L.A. In fact, she has even started trying to date a few 
famous people. Maria usually works hard to become popular. She often finds herself rushing 
from one social gathering to the next and is always going to pick up some alcohol or a dress. 
 
Almost every single day Maria is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
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The reason Maria feels this way is that Maria is so preoccupied with becoming popular that she 
is no longer concerned with being honest or nice to her old friends unless they know someone 
famous. Almost every night she ends up drinking or partying with famous people she wants to be 
like. 
 
Agent 2: Morally good condition with negative psychological states 
 
Maria is the mother of three children who all really love her. In fact, they couldn’t imagine 
having a better mom. Maria usually stays pretty busy taking care of her children. She often finds 
herself rushing from one birthday party to the next, visiting friends important to her children. 
 
Almost every single day Maria is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly unsatisfied with the way she lives. 
 
The reason Maria feels this way is that while Maria has been preoccupied with her children, she 
still makes an effort to be nice and spend time with her old friends. Almost every night she ends 
up helping her children or planning something for her children’s future. 
 
Agent 2: Morally bad condition with negative psychological states 
 
Maria wants to live the life of a celebrity in L.A. In fact, she has even started trying to date a few 
famous people. Maria usually works hard to become popular. She often finds herself rushing 
from one social gathering to the next and is always going to pick up some alcohol or a dress. 
 
Almost every single day Maria is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Maria thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly unsatisfied with the way she lives. 
 
The reason Maria feels this way is that Maria is so preoccupied with becoming popular that she 
is no longer concerned with being honest or nice to her old friends unless they know someone 
famous. Almost every night she ends up drinking or partying with famous people she wants to be 
like. 
 
Agent 3: Morally good condition with positive psychological states 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local community college. His job is very busy, but he meets many different 
people attending the college. 
 
Almost every single day Tom is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
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The reason Tom feels this way is that every day Tom takes the autistic and handicapped students 
from class to class and talks with them about how they are doing and whether they are 
experiencing any problems. Tom always wonders whether he could be doing more to help these 
students get through their day without struggling, and to fit in with their peers. Occasionally, 
Tom hears stories about how hard it is for these students, who end up getting bullied or having to 
leave the college. 
 
Agent 3: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local community college. His job is very busy, but he meets many different 
people attending the college. 
  
Almost every single day Tom is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
  
The reason Tom feels this way is that every day after school Tom goes from locker to locker and 
steals belongings from the students and re-sells these belongings to buy himself alcohol. He 
occasionally puts stolen items in black students’ lockers so that they're blamed for the thefts. 
Tom always wonders whether he could be stealing more. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about 
how hard it is for these students, who end up getting bullied or having to leave the college. 
 
Agent 3: Morally good condition with negative psychological states 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local community college. His job is very busy, but he meets many different 
people attending the college. 
  
Almost every single day Tom is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly unsatisfied with the way he lives. 
  
The reason Tom feels this way is that every day Tom takes the autistic and handicapped students 
from class to class and talks with them about how they are doing and whether they are 
experiencing any problems. Tom always wonders whether he could be doing more to help these 
students get through their day without struggling, and to fit in with their peers. Occasionally, 
Tom hears stories about how hard it is for these students, who end up getting bullied or having to 
leave the college. 
 
Agent 3: Morally bad condition with negative psychological states 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local community college. His job is very busy, but he meets many different 
people attending the college. 
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Almost every single day Tom is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly unsatisfied with the way he lives. 
  
The reason Tom feels this way is that every day after school Tom goes from locker to locker and 
steals belongings from the students and re-sells these belongings to buy himself alcohol. He 
occasionally puts stolen items in black students’ lockers so that they're blamed for the thefts. 
Tom always wonders whether he could be stealing more. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about 
how hard it is for these students, who end up getting bullied or having to leave the college. 
 
Agent 4: Morally good condition with positive psychological states 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta. 
  
Almost every single day Garrett is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
  
The reason Garret feels this way is that a few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her 
parents passed away. Almost every night, she asks him to read long books to her late at night so 
that she can fall asleep. Garrett always wonders if he could be doing more and debates what kind 
of effect his actions will have on his niece's life. Often, they also talk about what she did that day 
and the feelings she's had since her parents died. 
 
Agent 4: Morally bad condition with positive psychological states  
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta. 
  
Almost every single day Garrett is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
  
The reason Garret feels this way is that a few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her 
parents passed away. Almost every night, he pressures her to have sex with him late at night. 
Garrett always wonders what kind of effect his action will have on his niece's life, but then 
reminds himself that he's the only reason she's not homeless. Often, they also talk about what she 
did that day and the feelings she's had since her parents died. 
 
Agent 4: Morally good condition with negative psychological states 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta. 
  
Almost every single day Garrett is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
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emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly unsatisfied with the way he lives. 
  
The reason Garret feels this way is that a few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her 
parents passed away. Almost every night, she asks him to read long books to her late at night so 
that she can fall asleep. Garrett always wonders if he could be doing more and debates what kind 
of effect his actions will have on his niece's life. Often, they also talk about what she did that day 
and the feelings she's had since her parents died. 
 
Agent 4: Morally bad condition with negative psychological states 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man who lives in the suburbs of Atlanta. 
  
Almost every single day Garrett is in a bad mood and generally experiences a lot of unpleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience positive emotions like joy or 
excitement. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly unsatisfied with the way he lives. 
  
The reason Garret feels this way is that a few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her 
parents passed away. Almost every night, he pressures her to have sex with him late at night. 
Garrett always wonders what kind of effect his action will have on his niece's life, but then 
reminds himself that he's the only reason she's not homeless. Often, they also talk about what she 
did that day and the feelings she's had since her parents died. 
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Vignettes from Study 5 
 
Agent 1: Non-morally good condition – No psychological Info 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah has become very wealthy after things went unexpectedly well when she invested the 
money she earned from her new job. Not that long ago, Sarah did not have the money to take 
vacations, go to restaurants or buy nice clothes. She, also had to live in a small shared apartment 
with people didn’t know before moving in. Now that Sarah has become wealthy, she can take 
vacations whenever she wants, regularly eats at her favorite restaurants and has an entirely new 
wardrobe. She also now lives in a beautiful house in a nice part of town. 
 
Agent 1: Non-morally bad condition – No psychological Info 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah has become very poor after things went unexpectedly badly when she invested the money 
she earned from her new job. Not that long ago, Sarah had the money to take vacations, go to 
restaurants and buy nice clothes. She, also got to live in a beautiful house in a nice part of town. 
Now that Sarah has become poor, she can no longer take vacations, never eats at her favorite 
restaurants and has an entirely old wardrobe. She also now lives in a small shared apartment with 
people she didn’t know before moving in. 
 
Agent 1: Morally good condition – No psychological Info 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah stays incredibly busy all day helping the many sick children who depend on her for their 
medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to help all of them. Every day she 
carefully measures how much medicine she will give each child, and then watches to make sure 
the child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have been helped by her, but 
she thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Agent 1: Morally bad condition – No psychological Info 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah stays incredibly busy all day poisoning the many sick children who depend on her for their 
medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to poison all of them. Every day she 
carefully measures how much poison she will give each child, and then watches to make sure the 
child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have been killed by her, but she 
thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Agent 1: Non-morally good condition – Psychological Info 
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After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah has become very wealthy after things went unexpectedly well when she invested the 
money she earned from her new job. Not that long ago, Sarah did not have the money to take 
vacations, go to restaurants or buy nice clothes. She, also had to live in a small shared apartment 
with people didn’t know before moving in. Now that Sarah has become wealthy, she can take 
vacations whenever she wants, regularly eats at her favorite restaurants and has an entirely new 
wardrobe. She also now lives in a beautiful house in a nice part of town.  
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 1: Non-morally bad condition – Psychological Info 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah has become very poor after things went unexpectedly badly when she invested the money 
she earned from her new job. Not that long ago, Sarah had the money to take vacations, go to 
restaurants and buy nice clothes. She, also got to live in a beautiful house in a nice part of town. 
Now that Sarah has become poor, she can no longer take vacations, never eats at her favorite 
restaurants and has an entirely old wardrobe. She also now lives in a small shared apartment with 
people she didn’t know before moving in. 
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 1: Morally good condition – Psychological Info 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah stays incredibly busy all day helping the many sick children who depend on her for their 
medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to help all of them. Every day she 
carefully measures how much medicine she will give each child, and then watches to make sure 
the child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have been helped by her, but 
she thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
  
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 1: Morally bad condition – Psychological Info 
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After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah stays incredibly busy all day poisoning the many sick children who depend on her for their 
medication. She often wonders whether she will be able to poison all of them. Every day she 
carefully measures how much poison she will give each child, and then watches to make sure the 
child swallows it. Sarah doesn’t really know how many children have been killed by her, but she 
thinks about it when she falls asleep at night. 
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 2: Non-morally good condition – No psychological Info 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local school in small town near to where he lives.  
 
Tom has an incredibly easy and engaging job. Each day, Tom spends his hours at work walking 
around the school. He has a lot of different jobs that he can help out with, so he gets to choose 
whatever he wants to do each day. This means that Tom gets to learn about different skills, and 
talk to many different people throughout the day. When the weather is nice, Tom spends the day 
outside and works on the grounds around the school. Other days, Tom helps out in the school 
kitchen or cleans the halls while he talks with students. 
 
Agent 2: Non-morally bad condition – No psychological Info 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local school in small town near to where he lives. 
  
Tom has an incredibly hard and tedious job. Each day, Tom spends his at hours at work inside 
bathrooms or gym locker rooms at the school. He is responsible for cleaning toilets and 
scrubbing old showers which are often covered in mold and stains that are very difficult to 
remove. The chemicals he uses to clean are extremely strong, so they can easily cause rashes and 
always smell terrible. If Tom finishes cleaning the toilets and showers, his next job is to scrub 
the inside of the lockers, which are small and hard to reach into, but are also extremely dirty. 
 
Agent 2: Morally good condition – No psychological Info 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local school in small town near to where he lives.  
 
Every day, Tom takes the autistic and handicapped students from class to class and talks with 
them about how they are doing and whether they are experiencing any problems. Tom always 
wonders whether he could be doing more to help these students get through their day without 
struggling, and to fit in with their peers. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about how hard it is for 
these students, who end up getting bullied or having to leave the school. 
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Agent 2: Morally bad condition – No psychological Info 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local school in small town near to where he lives. 
  
Every day after school Tom goes from locker to locker and steals belongings from the students 
and re-sells these belongings to buy himself alcohol. He occasionally puts stolen items in black 
students’ lockers so that they're blamed for the thefts. Tom always wonders whether he could be 
stealing more. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about how hard it is for these students, who end 
up getting bullied or having to leave the school. 
 
Agent 2: Non-morally good condition – Psychological Info 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local school in small town near to where he lives.  
 
Tom has an incredibly easy and engaging job. Each day, Tom spends his hours at work walking 
around the school. He has a lot of different jobs that he can help out with, so he gets to choose 
whatever he wants to do each day. This means that Tom gets to learn about different skills, and 
talk to many different people throughout the day. When the weather is nice, Tom spends the day 
outside and works on the grounds around the school. Other days, Tom helps out in the school 
kitchen or cleans the halls while he talks with students.  
 
Almost every single day Tom is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
 
Agent 2: Non-morally bad condition – Psychological Info 
 
After going to nursing school for several years, Sarah got a job at the children’s hospital.  
 
Sarah has become very poor after things went unexpectedly badly when she invested the money 
she earned from her new job. Not that long ago, Sarah had the money to take vacations, go to 
restaurants and buy nice clothes. She, also got to live in a beautiful house in a nice part of town. 
Now that Sarah has become poor, she can no longer take vacations, never eats at her favorite 
restaurants and has an entirely old wardrobe. She also now lives in a small shared apartment with 
people she didn’t know before moving in. 
 
Almost every single day Sarah is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that she would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Sarah thinks about her life, she always comes to the same conclusion: she is 
highly satisfied with the way she lives. 
 
Agent 2: Morally good condition – Psychological Info 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local school in small town near to where he lives.  
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Every day, Tom takes the autistic and handicapped students from class to class and talks with 
them about how they are doing and whether they are experiencing any problems. Tom always 
wonders whether he could be doing more to help these students get through their day without 
struggling, and to fit in with their peers. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about how hard it is for 
these students, who end up getting bullied or having to leave the school. 
  
Almost every single day Tom is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
 
Agent 2: Morally bad condition – Psychological Info 
 
Tom is a janitor at a local school in small town near to where he lives.  
 
Every day after school Tom goes from locker to locker and steals belongings from the students 
and re-sells these belongings to buy himself alcohol. He occasionally puts stolen items in black 
students’ lockers so that they're blamed for the thefts. Tom always wonders whether he could be 
stealing more. Occasionally, Tom hears stories about how hard it is for these students, who end 
up getting bullied or having to leave the school. 
 
Almost every single day Tom is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Tom thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
 
Agent 3: Non-morally good condition – No psychological Info 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man, who moved away from where he grew up after finishing 
high school. 
  
The area that Garrett now lives in is incredibly convenient to get to and close to everything 
including excellent restaurants and beautiful parks. Whenever Garrett wants to get anywhere, 
even to a sports arena, it takes him just a few minutes to get to the subway that connects him to 
all of the other parts of town. Because of this, Garrett doesn’t spend much time at home, and 
often goes out to eat at new restaurants or see some of the many shows that come through his 
town. 
 
Agent 3: Non-morally bad condition – No psychological Info 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man, who moved away from where he grew up after finishing 
high school. 
  
The area that Garrett now lives in is incredibly inconvenient to get to and far away from 
everything other than a few houses and some farmers’ fields. Whenever Garrett wants to get 
anywhere, even just to a grocery store, it takes him at least a forty-five minutes to get to the 
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highway that connects him to areas that have stores. Because of this, Garrett rarely ever leaves 
his small house, and doesn’t do much other than sometimes walk along the roads nearby or 
watch the cows. 
 
Agent 3: Morally good condition – No psychological Info 
 
Garrett is a forty-five year old man, who moved away from where he grew up after finishing 
high school. 
  
A few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her parents passed away. Almost every night, 
she asks him to read long books to her late at night so that she can fall asleep. Garrett always 
wonders if he could be doing more and debates what kind of effect his actions will have on his 
niece's life. Often, they also talk about what she did that day and the feelings she's had since her 
parents died. 
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Garrett is a forty-five year old man, who moved away from where he grew up after finishing 
high school. 
  
A few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her parents passed away. Almost every night, 
he pressures her to have sex with him late at night. Garrett always wonders what kind of effect 
his action will have on his niece's life, but then reminds himself that he's the only reason she's 
not homeless. Often, they also talk about what she did that day and the feelings she's had since 
her parents died. 
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Almost every single day Garrett is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
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she asks him to read long books to her late at night so that she can fall asleep. Garrett always 
wonders if he could be doing more and debates what kind of effect his actions will have on his 
niece's life. Often, they also talk about what she did that day and the feelings she's had since her 
parents died. 
 
Almost every single day Garrett is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
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A few years ago, his niece moved in with him after her parents passed away. Almost every night, 
he pressures her to have sex with him late at night. Garrett always wonders what kind of effect 
his action will have on his niece's life, but then reminds himself that he's the only reason she's 
not homeless. Often, they also talk about what she did that day and the feelings she's had since 
her parents died. 
 
Almost every single day Garrett is in a great mood and generally experiences a lot of pleasant 
emotions. In fact, it is very rare that he would ever experience negative emotions like sadness or 
loneliness. When Garrett thinks about his life, he always comes to the same conclusion: he is 
highly satisfied with the way he lives. 
